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SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
By letter dated April 6, 2011, the Court requested that the parties "address the 
issue of whether the Modification of Business Loan Agreement and Promissory Note is 
an enforceable agreement." 
I. The Modification Agreement is Valid and Enforceable. 
Under Utah law, the existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a question of law. 
John Deere Co. v. A & H Equip., Inc.. 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah 1994). The "formation 
of a contract 'requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the 
exchange and .. . consideration.'" Aquagen Intern. Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 
413 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). Thus, "[a] condition precedent to the enforcement of 
any contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled 
out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced." Valcarce 
v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1961). "Contractual mutual assent requires assent by 
all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the 
terms." Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978). 
Moreover, "[f]or a promise to be legally enforceable, it must be supported by 
consideration." Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc., 706 
P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). "Consideration is an act or promise, bargained for and 
given in exchange for a promise." Id Any act or promise, bargained for and given in 
exchange for a promise, constitutes consideration. See icf 
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In this case? the Modification of Business Loan Agreement and Promissory Note 
(R. 972-76), dated October 2, 2006 (the "Modification Agreement"), is valid and 
enforceable. It clearly "spell[s] out'* the "express" terms of the parties' agreement, and 
thereby evidences "a meeting of minds of the parties . . . with sufficient defmiteness to be 
enforced." See Valcarce, 362 P.2d at 428. It is also supported by consideration— 
including, for example, the Borrowers' payment of an extension fee and release and 
waiver of claims, in exchange for KeyBank's agreement to extend the loan term, which 
KeyBank actually did. (R. 972-73, 977-80.) 
II. The Modification Agreement Was Signed by the Parties to be Charged, 
Making It Enforceable Against the Borrowers Even If KeyBank Did Not 
Sign. 
Further, the Modification Agreement was signed by the Borrowers, as required by 
statute to be enforceable. "The general rule in Utah is that a credit agreement is void 
unless it is in writing and signed by the party to be charged with the agreement." Wright 
Express Fin. Servs. Corp. v. ACAS Acquisition (Logex), Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
84266 (D. Utah Nov. 14, 2007) (unpublished/attached); see a]so Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-
4(l)(f) ("(1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or 
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the 
agreement: . . . (f) every credit agreement."). This is based on the well-settled and 
universally recognized principle that an agreement "need only be signed by that party 
who is sought to be charged." Weightman v. Caldwell 17 U.S. 85, 89 (1819) (citations 
omitted). 
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The Utah Code defines "credit agreement" to mean "an agreement by a financial 
institution to: (1) lend, delay, or otherwise modify an obligation to repay money, goods, 
or things in action; (11) otherwise extend credit; or (III) make any other financial 
1 
accommodation." Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(2)(a)(i)(A). Here, the Modification 
Agreement was made by KeyBank to "lend," "modify," "extend credit," and make other 
"financial accommodation^]" for the benefit of the Borrowers, based on the original 
Promissory Note, dated January 10, 2001. (R. 934-35.) Accordingly, the Modification 
Agreement constitutes a "credit agreement" for which a signature "by the party to be 
charged with the agreement" is required for enforceability. 
Although KeyBank did not sign the Modification Agreement, the Borrowers—the 
parties who were "sought to be charged" with the Modification Agreement—did. 
Moreover, all subsequent modifications and change in terms agreements executed by the 
parties (see R. 977-80) demonstrate KeyBank's acceptance and ratification of the 
Modification Agreement and the Borrowers' understanding that the Modification 
Agreement was valid and enforceable. 
A party can indicate its intention to enter into a binding contract through its 
actions rather than its signature. It is axiomatic that a party may become 
bound through its performance to a contract that it has not signed . . . It is a 
fundamental contract law that the parties may become bound by the terms 
of a contract even though they did not sign the contract, where they have 
otherwise indicated their acceptance of the contract, or led the other party to 
so believe that they have accepted the contract. . . . It is established that a 
signature is not always necessary to create a binding agreement.... It is 
likewise established that the purpose of a signature is to demonstrate 
"mutuality of assent" which could as well be shown through the conduct of 
the parties.. . . That [a party] failed to sign the agreement is immaterial for 
any written contract though signed only by one of the parties binds the 
other if he accepts it and both act in reliance on it as a valid contract. . . . If 
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a person has accepted a written agreement and has acted upon it he is bound 
by it 
Becker v. HSA/Wexford Bancgroup, L.L.C., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1248-1249 (D. Utah 
2001) (citations omitted). 
As a matter of undisputed fact and law, the parties entered into subsequent 
agreements on the strength of the prior Modification Agreement. (R. 977-80.) 
Otherwise, the loans would previously have come due, and the Borrowers would already 
have been in default for failure to pay when due. Either way, summary judgment based 
on the Borrowers' defaults was appropriately granted. 
III. The Borrowers Cannot Dispute That They Were in Material Breach, 
Relieving KeyBank of Any Obligation to Continue Lending. 
There can be no dispute that the Borrowers committed numerous material 
breaches and defaults under the loan documents, including the Modification Agreement. 
uThe law is well settled that a material breach by one party to a contract excuses further 
performance by the non-breaching party." Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 
P.2d 295, 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In this case, the Borrowers indisputably breached the Modification Agreement and 
other loan documents by failing to provide accounts receivable information to maintain 
their borrowing base, failing to provide financial statements, failing to maintain the 
minimum assets-to-liabilities ratio, failing to provide tax returns, becoming insolvent, 
failing to provide Halverson's personal financial information, and failing to disclose a 
change in ownership and material adverse change in financial condition, among other 
things. See Appellee's Br., pp. 10-12 (citing the record). The District Court correctly 
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concluded that these various breaches and defaults were material, that the Borrowers did 
not dispute them, and that KeyBank was entitled to summary judgment as a result. 
Because of these breaches, the Borrowers are and were in no position to allege that 
KeyBank had an obligation to continue lending to them, under the Modification 
Agreement or otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, together with those reasons set forth in KeyBank's 
original and first supplemental briefs, this Court should affirm the District Court's 
judgment. ^ ^ 
i* -
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Gerald H. Suniville 
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OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Wright Express Financial Services Corporation's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The court held a hearing on the motion on October 11, 2007. At 
the hearing, Plaintiff was represented by Mark Callister, and Defendants were represented by 
Matthew Lalli and Amber Mettler. The court took the motion under advisement. The court has 
carefully considered all pleadings, memoranda, and other materials submitted by the parties. 
The court has further considered the arguments made by counsel at the hearing and the law 
and facts relevant to the motions. Now being fully advised, the court enters the following 
Memorandum [ * 2 ] Decision and Order. 
BACKGROUND 
On December 5, 2005, Plaintiff Wright Express Financial Services entered into a Business 
Charge Account Agreement ("Fleet Charge Agreement") with Defendant ACAS Acquisition, Inc. 
("ACAS"). Under this Agreement, Plaintiff established a line of commercial credit for ACAS in the 
amount of $ 3 million. Also, on December 29, 2005, ACAS entered into a Corporate Card 
Program Master Agreement with Plaintiff. Under this MasterCard Agreement, Plaintiff established 
a line of commercial credit for ACAS in the amount of $ 350,000. This amount was increased to 
$ 600,000 in March 2006, and then increased again to $ 1,600,000 in April 2006. 
This court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment and entered judgment against ACAS in the 
amount of $ 3,442,802.33 for failing to pay its obligations owing under the agreements. Plaintiff 
claims, however, that ACAS is just a shell holding company. Therefore, Plaintiff brings this 
motion for summary judgment for the same amount against the other two defendants, Logex 
Corporation and Logistics Express, Inc. ("LEI"), both of which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of 
ACAS. Defendant LEI is a company in the business of transporting gas and other [ *3 ] related 
products. LEI is a subsidiary of Defendant Logex, which, in turn, is a subsidiary of ACAS. 
ACAS was the only signatory to the written agreements with Plaintiff. However, ACAS sent the 
combined financial and asset information of ACAS, Logex, and LEI when it was applying for the 
credit. In December 2006, Plaintiff requested that Logex and LEI sign the agreements as well. 
LEI and Logex refused to execute the agreements. 
Pursuant to the Fleet Charge Agreement and the MasterCard Agreement between Plaintiff and 
ACAS, Plaintiff issued charge cards to employees, representatives, or agents of Logex and LEI 
who were authorized by ACAS to use the charge cards in connection with business operations. 
The charges on these cards were made under the credit lines established by Plaintiff as a result 
of the agreements with ACAS. ACAS admits that the $ 3,442,802.33 owing to Plaintiff for 
charges made by employees of Logex and LEI were incurred pursuant to the credit line provided 
to ACAS. Defendants Logex and LEI were aware that their employees were charging business-
related expenses on the cards issued by Plaintiff. 
Included in each shipment of Fleet charge cards to employees of Logex and LEI was [ *4 ] a 
copy of the Wright Express Business Charge Account Agreement. The Cardholder Agreement 
states, "Your use of your account indicates your acceptance of this Wright Express Business 
Charge Account Agreement." The Fleet charge cards contained the statement: "Use of this card 
constitutes acceptance of the terms and conditions of the cardholder agreement under which 
this card was issued, as amended from time to time." The Fleet Cardholder Agreement between 
Plaintiff and ACAS provides that the "business card holder" agrees to pay "the face amount of all 
such credit obligations created by use of a Card." 
Included in each shipment of MasterCards was a copy of the MasterCard Cardholder Agreement, 
which states, "Any use of your Card or Account confirms your acceptance of the terms and 
conditions of this Cardholder Agreement." On the back of each Mastercard issued to these 
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employees was a statement that reads, "Your card is issued and serviced by Wright Express 
Financial Services Corporation pursuant to license by MasterCard International. Its use is 
subject to the terms and conditions of your Card Member Agreement." The MasterCard 
Cardholder Agreements provides that each entity receiving a card [ *5 ] under the MasterCard 
Agreement is responsible to pay the full amount owed on the Account. 
The parties appear to dispute that the MasterCard Agreement included a provision whereby the 
parties agreed to centralized billings. The parties also dispute whether centralized billings Is 
relevant to the issues presented in this motion. 
Defendants Logex and LEI admit that they have failed and refused to pay the amounts owed to 
Plaintiff under the Fleet Charge Agreement and the MasterCard Agreement, Logex and LEI 
assert that they are not responsible for ACAS's agreements. ACAS has suffered severe financial 
problems and has been unable to pay its debts. 
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Although Plaintiff has already obtained judgment against ACAS for the amount due and owing 
under its agreements, Plaintiff argues that ACAS is merely a holding company with no real 
ability to pay the debt. Therefore, Plaintiff seeks judgment against Defendants Logex and LEI for 
the same amount it received judgment against ACAS. 
Plaintiff claims that under Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-4(2)(e), Logex and LEI are liable 
to Plaintiff under the cardholder agreements that Defendants received when Plaintiff 
[ *6 ] shipped the credit cards to employees of Logex and LEI and used them for the business 
purposes of Logex and LEI. Section 25-5-4(2)(e), which is part of the Utah Statute of Frauds, 
provides as follows: 
H / V i :?(e) A credit agreement is binding and enforceable without any signature by 
the party to be charged if: 
(i) the debtor is provided with a written copy of the terms of the agreement: 
(ii) the agreement provides that any use of the credit offered shall constitute 
acceptance of those terms; and 
(iii) after the debtor receives the agreement, the debtor, or a person authorized by 
the debtor, requests funds pursuant to the credit agreement or otherwise uses the 
credit offered. 
Id. 
In this case, Plaintiff sent copies of the Fleet Charge Agreement and MasterCard Cardholder 
Agreement to certain officers of Logex and LEI along with cards that were used by those 
officers. Defendants, however, contend that it is inappropriate to apply an exception to the 
Statute of Frauds in this situation because there is a signed agreement between Plaintiff and 
ACAS for the credit that was used. 
H/v2?Unsigned form credit agreements, identical in all respects to the agreements signed 
between Plaintiff and ACAS, forwarded to [ * 7 ] known related parties covered by signed 
agreements, cannot create separate obligations on the part of the subsidiaries. If such actions 
could create new contractual obligations between the parties, it would violate the integration 
clauses in the Credit Agreements. Both agreements state that they contain the entire agreement 
between the parties and that no modification is valid unless set forth in a written agreement 
signed by both parties. 
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H/V3TThe general rule in Utah is that a credit agreement is void unless it is in writing and signed 
by the party to be charged with the agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4( l ) ( f ) (Supp. 2007). 
The court is unwilling to expand the exception to the Statute of Fraud's signature requirement, 
which applies when there is no written credit agreement, to a situation where the card user was 
a user contemplated by and/or covered by existing signed agreements. Although the court does 
not condone a party's actions to avoid payment of their credit obligations, the court does not 
believe that Plaintiffs recourse lies in the Statute of Frauds. Rather, Plaintiff appears to have 
adequate recourse under its unjust enrichment claim and under contract law. 
There are potential [ *8 ] ambiguities in the agreements with respect to Logex's and LEI's 
potential liability under the agreements. Defendants argue that under the terms of the 
agreements they are not liable for the credit agreements entered into between Plaintiff and 
ACAS, and this court should not expand liability to known third parties who were not made 
signatories to the agreements. The signed agreements identify only ACAS as the company 
responsible to pay Plaintiff. But ACAS's credit application to Plaintiff consisted of Consolidated 
Financial Statements that included the accounts of ACAS, Logex, and LEI. In other words, ACAS 
used the assets of Logex and LEI to obtain credit from Plaintiff. For purposes of this motion, the 
court need not resolve factual issues relating to Logex and LEI's liability on the written credit 
agreement executed by ACAS. 
However, the summary judgment motion now before the court also seeks summary judgment 
on Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim. H/V4"?Under Utah law, to establish a claim of unjust 
enrichment, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) the 
conferee appreciates or has knowledge of the benefit; and (3) the conferee retains the benefit 
under [ * 9 ] such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit 
without payment of its value. Bluffdale City v. Smith, 156 P.3d 175, n.2, 2007 UT App 25 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2007). 
In this case, the CFO of Logex and ACAS submitted a credit application that represented ACAS 
as a consolidated company comprised of the assets of Logex and LEI. Both defendants admit 
that charge cards issued by Plaintiff were used by Logex or LEI employees for business 
expenses. Having used their assets to obtain credit from Plaintiff that was in fact used in the 
operation of their business, allowing Logex and LEI to retain this benefit without payment to 
Plaintiff would be inequitable. 
Based on the record presently before the court, the court is prepared to rule in Plaintiff's favor 
on the unjust enrichment claim. Nevertheless, the court recognizes that Plaintiff did not move 
for summary judgment on its unjust enrichment claim until its reply memorandum, and neither 
party directly addressed the issue at oral argument. In addition, Defendants changed counsel 
between the briefing of the motion and oral argument. Because Defendants have not addressed 
the unjust enrichment claim, the court will allow Defendants [ * 1 0 ] twenty days to submit a 
surreply on the unjust enrichment claim. Plaintiffs may then submit a final reply on the issue 
within ten days. The court will then issue its ruling on the unjust enrichment claim without a 
further hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above reasoning, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the 
Statute of Frauds is DENIED. The motion on Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim shall be briefed 
according to the schedule set forth above. 
DATED this 14th day of November, 2007. 
BY THE COURT 
I si Dale A. Kimball 
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